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Mister: The Drama of Black Manhood in
Faulkner and Morrison
Philip M. Weinstein

I wish to begin at what appears to be a certain distance from my
topic—“Mister”—by reflecting on what it means to come back
to this conference, for the fifth time to be standing on this
podium. No one does it for the money, and the weather in
August can be downright uncomfortable. Nevertheless, when I
arrive, usually a few days before my talk, I find myself helplessly
acting out a Faulknerian scenario. Deep in Go Down, Moses, I
am on the threshold of yet another hunt—male and female this
time—wondering who’s going to be here, how many familiar
faces, how many new ones, whether this will be the year we
catch him once and for all. And I say to myself what a laconic
Sam Fathers says to the eager Ike McCaslin: “We aint got the
dog yet.”^
“We aint got the dog yet”: this won’t be the year we catch up
with, gain possession over, the writer who is both our beloved
and our prey. He’ll escape once again. However indelibly this
year’s talks may (or may not) capture Faulkner’s meanings, he’ll
elude our chase; we’ll regroup next summer and begin again.
Indeed, what would it mean to capture him? Could we ever
have the dog that secures a final grasp upon our desired object?
Would we want this even if we could achieve it?
We continue to participate in the Go Down, Moses hunt,
seeking less to capture him than to invoke him, wanting this
event in time—a week in August—to partake as well in some
thing that has happened often enough to seem timeless: “the
old bear absolved of mortality and himself who shared a little of
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it” {GDM 195). As with a love affair, it may be the radiance of
encounter rather than penetration or possession that we re after.
Our entries into the beloved’s textual body leave him fabulously
unmarked: “forever wilt thou love and she be fair.”
In his name we foregather, and there would be no pursuit if
he were not its object, yet this ritual is as much about the
hunters as the hunted. He is the unifying occasion in whose
name we play out “the best game of all, the best of all breathing
and forever the best of all listening, the voices quiet and weighty
and deliberate for retrospection and recollection and exactitude.
. . . There was always a bottle present” {GDM 184). “We aint
got the dog yet. ” We don’t want the dog; we would refuse him
if we had him. We come for refreshment (in its several senses),
we come to encounter rather than to penetrate: a good hunt is
one that makes us look forward to the next one next year. The
name for this activity, for why I’ve been coming to Oxford in
August since 1985, is not possession but identification.
The boundedness of possession (of self and of the other)
versus the fluidity of identification (of self with the other):
between these two extremes we may begin to conceptualize a
more flexible poetics of identity. At the one extreme, identity—
one’s own, that of others—is imagined as a possessible property.
At the other extreme it is an aleatory, interpenetrable, and
frighteningly vulnerable resource. The one is solid, with the
strengths and weaknesses that attach to solidity. The other is
liquid, with the strengths and weaknesses that attach to liquid
ity. Treating them both as psychological propensities, Freud
distinguishes possession and identification as the desire to have
the other versus the desire to be the other. Though he also
stresses that “identification ... is ambivalent from the very
first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into
a wish for someone’s removal,” he makes it clear that possession
accesses the other as object while identification seeks (impossi
bly) to access the other as subject.^ These opening remarks, I
hope, no longer seem so distant from my topic, for the terms of
possession and identification not only describe our commerce

The Drama of Black Manhood

275

with Faulkner and each other, but also take me to “Mister: The
Drama of Black Manhood in Faulkner and Morrison.”
♦

*

*

Years after the [Civil] war white Southerners sighed with
relief when Booker T. Washington received a doctorate.
They had too much respect for him to call him “Booker”
and could not call any black man “Mr.”; but “Dr. Washing
ton” presented no problem.
—Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, fordan. Roll:
The World the Slaves Made
Mister: the term articulates two specific moments of racial/
gender crisis in Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses and Morrison’s
Beloved. More broadly, it puts before us, as in this early
twentieth-century white dilemma over how to address Booker
T. Washington, a host of racial/gender norms. Descended from
“master,” Mister performs as an address of respect. Whatever
ironic inflections it may take on notwithstanding, the term
acknowledges a sustained distance between self and other, a
minimal space surrounding the male designated Mister that
keeps him, so to speak, intact within a field of address. Children
are not yet Misters, not yet inserted into the social network
securely enough to receive this deference. Thus Mr. both
betokens male adulthood as achieved insertion within the sym
bolic order—one can only be Mr. within a larger community
of Misters—and simultaneously declares a certain measure of
autonomy. To be addressed as Mr. is to be addressed properly,
with propriety, with the implication of property. All three of
these notions—^property, propriety, the proper—are inter
twined components of the mastery that stands behind Mister,
and they point to those aspects of manhood reserved for the
white Master, denied explicitly to the black male slave and
implicitly to the black freedman.^
Mister may further imply, I want to argue, a completed
negotiation of the Oedipal crisis itself All Misters are deemed
to have passed through the crucible of potentially crippling
infantile confusions and to be credentialed as fully individuated
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human beings within the social order. They have internalized
the father’s authority (in the form of the superego), become
capable of policing themselves, achieved adult identity. Proper
tied or not. Misters are assumed to be self-owning and entitled
to larger ownership; fathers or not, they may occupy paternal
terrain.^ The refusal of Southern white culture to call Booker T.
Washington “Mr.” is a refusal to grant him manhood within that
culture’s registers of property, propriety, and the proper: the
potential property of goods and land that define the birthright of
white post-Enlightenment males, the propriety of membership
within a community of white Misters, and the proper (the
propre, “one’s own”) of achieved masculinity itself. These are
the larger stakes at issue in the drama of black manhood.
*

*

*

Property, propriety, the proper: perhaps the greatest of these is
property. Before moving forward to the specific resonance of
these terms in Faulkner’s and Morrison’s texts, I want briefly to
rehearse the larger American claim for property as a defining
attribute of free men. That claim, of course, derives from the
European Enlightenment; its best-known source is probably
John Locke’s “Second Essay Concerning Civil Government”
(1690).® Seeking (in the wake of a century of religious war) to
shore up England’s 1688 bloodless revolution, proposing an
argument of natural law that would supersede any monarchical
constraint upon the subject, Locke writes: “The natural liberty
of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not
to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have
only the law of Nature for his rule” (283). Deeper than any
covenant imposed by church or king, Locke argues, is our
natural, inalienable liberty. This liberty acquires focus and
grounding through the concept of property: “Though the earth,
and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man
has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to
but himself The labour of his body and the work of his hands,
we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes
out of the state that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
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mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property” (287-88). Given these
convictions, Locke has no difficulty in assigning to government
its foremost purpose: “The great and chief end, therefore, of
men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves
under government, is the preservation of their property
(350-51)-

It would be hard to overestimate the appeal of this argument
to our Founding Fathers. Louis Hartz, seeking to characterize
this country’s liberal tradition, calls Locke “America’s philoso
pher” as he could never have been Europe’s: “When Locke
came to America ... a change appeared. Because the basic
feudal oppressions of Europe had not taken root, the fundamen
tal social norm of Locke ceased in large part to look like a norm
and began, of all things, to look like a sober description of fact.
. . . History was on a lark, out to tease men, not by shattering
their dreams, but by fulfilling them with a sort of satiric accu
racy.”® Our labor, the activation of our own personal resources,
the goods we individually gather through such expenditure of
energy: these are to be thought of (with a literalism inconceiv
able in the Old World) as our inalienable property, central to
our unfettered identity. British refusal to recognize—through
appropriate representation—this American right to property led
to a justified war of independence. The individual possession of
property is not only what we will go to war to protect, it is also
what most securely keeps the peace. “Government, thought the
Fathers, is based on property,” Richard Hofstadter writes.
“Men who have no property lack the necessary stake in an
orderly society to make stable or reliable citizens.”^ Noah
Webster extends this view in a 1787 commentary on the Consti
tution, seeing in the maintenance of property rights the very
basis of freedom:
Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that property is the
basis of power; and this, being established as a cardinal point,
directs us to the means of preserving our freedom. Make laws,
irrevocable laws in every state, destroying and barring entailments;
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leave real estates to revolve from hand to hand, as time and accident
may direct; and no family influence can be acquired and established
for a series of generations—no man can obtain dominion over a
large territory—the laborious and saving, who are generally the
best citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and
thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it is, in
the body of the people. A general and tolerably equal distribution
of landed property is the whole basis of national freedom

If property is proposed as the grounding concept of both
peace and freedom, we might begin to note the anxieties and
omissions that hedge this claim even in Locke and Webster,
and that have bedevilled it ever since.® Suppose that each did
not possess his share, that property were not spread through
the body of the people . . . [with] tolerably equal distribution,”
that one man did take more than he could actually make use of?
Suppose he did obtain “dominion over a large territory”? Locke
feebly argues that “He was only to look that he used them [the
goods that make up his property] before they spoiled, else he
took more than his share, and robbed others. And, indeed, it
was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than
he could make use of” (300). But this rejoinder had no more
force in 1690 than the following one penned 245 years later and
put into the mind of young Thomas Sutpen: “and as for objects,
nobody had any more of them than you did because everybody
had just what he was strong enough or energetic enough to take
and keep, and only that crazy man would go to the trouble to
take or even want more than he could eat or swap for powder
and whiskey.
But somebody always does have more than you do, and
Sutpen stumbles down from the mountain upon a Tidewater
drama that sharply subverts Locke: the spectacle of a white man
so engorged with property that his power is revealed not in his
labor—Locke’s crucial justificatory term—but in his indolence:
a man whom others fan and feed, who lords it over “a country
all divided and fixed and neat with a people living on it all
divided and fixed and neat because of what color their skins
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happened to be and what they happened to own” (AA 179).
Here the defects of the property schema leap into visibility. Far
from a natural right of every human being, it is always selec
tively distributed, first to industrious white males who under
wrote England’s bloodless revolution of 1688 and our bloody
one of 1776, thereafter to white males (even those originating
from the Old Bailey) cunning or hungry enough to acquire it.
Propertied white men not only may grow greedy for more
property, but there are other, gaping omissions on the American
scene: poor whites who lack property; women who both lack
property and are property; slaves who are nothing but property;
their offspring still in search of property. History only seemed
to be on a lark, for what beckoned as a manageable fact—the
effective accumulation of property—^would for many Americans
never be more than a dream. Founded on a premise destined
to implode from within—to make of class, gender, and race the
very factors that will cause the dream of identity-as-property to
collapse—^American culture comes into being, it seems, as a
white male drama with its tragic exclusions already inseparable
from its intoxicating promises. Faulkner and Morrison were
conceived centuries before they were bom. Before turning
specifically to Lucas Beauchamp and Paul D, I would like
briefly to probe the larger “repercussion” of property and self
ownership in both writers.
*

*

4c

Faulkner becomes Faulkner, paradoxically, by finding his way
into the drama of radically failed self-ownership. The voices of
Benjy and Quentin Compson testify eloquently to the collapse
of the American dream of identity-as-property. Rather than the
Lockean premise of successful labor, of a thmsting male will
that subdues and shapes an estate in its ovm image—that knows
itself through what it possesses—Faulkner gives us the drama
of interior dispossession. Caught up within a stream-of-consciousness technique that produces them not as subjects with a
coherent project but as cacophonous sites of cultural interfer
ence, Benjy and Quentin never do or own anything. Instead,
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they are done to, they suffer the consequences of previous
cultural designs gone awry: the burden of generations of Compson dysfunction comes to rest upon their ineffectual minds and
bodies. “I was trying to say” is the hallmark of Faulknerian
voice, and it can find utterance only when a culture’s known
forms of saying—of articulating social possibility as an achievable
personal project—have failed. Early Faulknerian voice is an
unforgettable way of saying No after a host of conventional ways
of saying Yes have proved bankrupt. “
Benjy, Quentin, Dari, Joe Christmas: these are the subjectivi
ties the early Faulkner most brilliantly produced; each signals
the unavailingness of cultural designs as maps for achievable
selfhood. If in Western culture the Oedipal crisis is the ordeal
the male child must go through in order to emerge as a
candidate for paternity and its perquisites—property, propriety,
the proper—then each of these figures remains arrested on the
threshold of that journey, dancing around a wound that precedes
the Oedipal. Damaged by defective or disappeared mothers,
insufficiently birthed into the culture’s symbolic orders (or
birthed into the culture’s insufficient symbolic orders), they
cannot manage the simplest tasks of self-ownership. Insecurely
gendered, incapable of separating internal from external, reso
lutely untrainable, these boychildren careen across the Faulk
nerian canvas, revealing fissure and contradiction wherever they
touch down. Desiring their mother or their sister or their
brother, they are hopelessly enmeshed in incest schemas, and
such schemas only deepen as scandal if the sibling turns out to
be black as well. Indeed, Faulkner found his way into the ordeal
of race through the ordeal of family, and in a certain sense he
never ceased to view racial torment as an epiphenomenon of
family torment. Incest and miscegenation are the prime motives
fueling his narrative, guaranteeing its subversion of Lockean
proprieties by contaminating all definitions of the proper. If
there is one thing his most memorable characters share, it is the
knowledge that they do not possess themselves. Is it too much
to say that a fear of contamination—an all but hysterical sensitiv-
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ity to odors and touches that have already invaded and deformed
before they are even recorded by consciousness—coils at the
core of Faulknerian sensibility? Or should we say that this
fear of contamination registers simultaneously an impossible
(because ideologically taboo) longing—a desire to cross illicit
boundaries (incestuous, miscegenous) in which successful trans
gression could only mean the death of the proper subject? At
any rate, from Donald Mahan to the reporter in Pylon to Chick
Mallison, a characteristic male note is to be moved beyond
control, overwhelmed: hardly traits on which a fiction commit
ted to the masculine pursuit of identity through attainment of
fixed property could be built.
Even if we grant that Faulkner’s work is invested in such a
critique of identity-as-property, we might also concede his
work’s yearning for achieved selfhood, attained project, the
successful maturation of child into property-bearing adult. Go
Down, Moses manages in its portrait of Ike McCaslin to attend
with equal generosity to why he must repudiate and what social
price he pays in repudiating. Who better than Faulkner could
understand a refusal to take on the guilt attaching to propertied
Southern adulthood, even as he shows both that property
repudiated remains property someone else will accept and
abuse, and that the undeviating pursuit of property could be an
epic male undertaking, however disastrous its eonsequences?
As for Morrison, her texts likewise reeognize that while
identity as self-contained property might foreclose one’s emo
tional resources, on the one hand—think of Macon Dead Jr. in
Song of Solomon—identity as unchecked identification threat
ens to run rampant over the fragile boundaries of one’s selfhood,
on the other. No one who has imagined the damage done to
individual identity by the institution of slavery—the attack on
sustaining psychic boundaries, the undoing of one s own selfpossession—^will discount the power of the freed Baby Suggs’s
discovery: “But suddenly she saw her hands and thought with a
clarity as simple as it was dazzling, ‘These hands belong to me.
These my hands.’
Hers to own, to make plans for, take

282

PHILIP M. WEINSTEIN

charge of; the text’s most lyrical passage rehearses Baby Suggs’s
sermon of self-ownership, of reclaiming your body from the
institution that had controlled it. “Claim” is a term that punctu
ates Morrison’s text: “Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming
ownership of that freed self was another” (B 95). The radically
unclaimed self—unable to count on its free labor as its own
property—is rudderless, a creature of others’ will, what Locke
quite deliberately calls a slave.
Beloved both endorses and provocatively calls into question
this model of achieved self-ownership—calls it into question not
least because no people who had experienced three centuries of
enslavement could afford to envisage their subjectivity in such
immaculate terms of self-management. If you had to own your
self to be yourself, and if this model could actually be realized
only for a certain class of white males, then what goes on inside
the mind and heart of all those others—unpropertied white
males, women, slaves—^for whom such a definition of who they
are is only a mockery of what they are? This is exactly the
question I want now to pursue, more deliberately, through
Faulkner’s and Morrison’s black males. Unable to be a Mister,
how does an unpropertied black male negotiate his manhood? I
turn to Lucas Beauchamp in a scene from “The Fire and the
Hearth” in Go Down, Moses.
“Are you the husband?” the Chancellor said.
“That’s right,” Lucas said.
“Say sir to the court!” the clerk said. Lucas glanced at the clerk.
“What?” he said. “I dont want no court. I done changed my—”
“Why you uppity—” the clerk began. . . .
“Not now,” Lucas said. “We don’t want no voce. Roth Edmonds
knows what I mean.”
“What? Who does?”
“Why, the uppity—” the clerk said. “Your Honor—” Again the
Chancellor raised his hand slightly toward the clerk. He still looked
at Lucas.
“Mister Roth Edmonds,” Lucas said . . . (GDM 124)

Are you the husband? ” The question resonates in the mind,
inasmuch as the deepest crisis Lucas Beauchamp undergoes in
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this novel revolves around his status as Molly s husband. If he
were Molly’s husband as a white man is husband of a white
woman, Zack would never have presumed upon Molly as his
own property (a presumption the text produces as normative
more than as transgressive). And Lucas would never have
needed to wonder, *How to God . . . can a black man ask a
white man to please not lay down with his black wife?’ ” (GDM
58) “Please”: the word betokens not personal timidity but a
structured nonmastery, a pleading with the master to abrogate
a right that is his in some way deeper than the law itself Of
course it was until 1865 the law itself: during slavery there were
no legal black marriages. Despite the overwhelming reliance
of black families upon this ceremony, it was for obvious reasons
illegal: in the eyes of the law the offspring of slaves belong to
the white master. “Are you the husband?” Earlier in the South
he would not have been, and Faulkner saturates this 1940s
court scene with Lucas’s continued eccentricity to legal norms.
We have here a Chancellor, a clerk, a Mister—and Lucas. Each
of these white titles conveys entitlement within the social
system, and the scandal Faulkner delights in is Lucas s never
theless insisting on agency. Pressured as to juridical identity,
menaced as to courtroom manners, Lucas insinuates his own
purpose into the scene: Roth Edmonds knows what I mean,
and Roth does. The price Lucas pays registers not in his
checkbook—Edmonds pays court costs—^but in that required
term of respect he must utter yet can never himself receive
from the lips of white men: “Mister.”
Faulkner dramatizes Lucas’s pursuit of an independent iden
tity as an ongoing struggle with the white Symbolic implicit in
“Mister.” His origin, announced in “The Bear” as already whitebestowed, “ledgered,” is what he seeks to rewrite:
not Lucius Quintus @c @c @c, but Lucas Quintus, not refusing to
be called Lucius, because he simply eliminated that word from the
name; not denying, declining the name itself, because he used
three quarters of it; but simply taking the name and changing,
altering it, making it no longer the white man’s but his own, by
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himself composed, himself selfprogenitive and nominate, by himself
ancestored . . . (GDM 269)

We should note the desperate illogic of this premise: how ean a
man ehange his name from inherited Lueius to invented Lucas
and be imagined as therefore free, self-progenitive, and nomi
nate? The old man, the original Lucius Quintus Carothers
McCaslin, dominates Lucas’s psychic life; all alterations relate
to this white origin. But Lucas strives to relate to it on equal
terms—Lucas to Lucius—whereas Isaac’s very name places him
in a structure of Biblical sonship, his moves limited to support
of or withdrawal from the parental narrative.
Lucas, by contrast, would step into the entitlements of that
narrative; this requires, however, taking on its originary white
male terms. Put starkly, Faulkner redresses Lucas’s race and
gender marginality—his lack of entitlement, of land, of secured
wife—not by immersing him within the living resources of a
native black culture, but by phantasmatically aligning him with
the authority of his white male soul-mates. Locked in an em
brace that harbors this text’s deepest yearning, Lucas is drama
tized in unforgettable encounter with Zack across the marriage
bed and with Old Carothers over the upholding of masculine
honor, just as in Intruder in the Dust he will be dramatized in
charged relation to Chick, his childlike suitor, and to Gavin, his
garrulous and frustrated brother. White to black, male to male,
each of these pairings figures the bond that Faulkner has
invested in, and each represses from view its excluded other:
black to black, male to female. “Are you the husband?” is the
surface question—are you capable of enforcing your claim to
your wife?—but the underlying question is different: “Are you
the man?”—can you hold your own with Old Carothers?
Thus when Lucas makes his way through Zack’s challenge to
his manhood by a ritual encounter of honor-bound moves,
advantages offered first by one and then by the other and
accepted by neither, the enemy cherished even as he is pursued
(all of this enacted over the wife-empty bridal bed)—^when
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Lucas terminates this love scene to his own satisfaction, he
thinks: “Old Carothers . . .1 needed him and he come and spoke
for me" {GDM 57). This suturing moment locates Lucas’s selfpossession within the fantasy of a white male structure of
subjectivity. He becomes himself by being spoken/spoken for
by Old Carothers. Defiantly risking his ovm life and Zack’s,
Lucas answers—as no one else in Go Down, Moses does an
swer—the old man’s original challenge. That challenge was
shaped, precisely, by the American property-model: simply to
take all you wanted and could get, to bend your will to no man s
rejoinder, to map the world and name its creatures as though
you were indeed your own ancestor and all others your progeny
or property. Go Down, Moses eloquently testifies to the inhu
manity of this project, but perhaps we have overlooked the
text’s covert longing for it nevertheless. Old Carothers, Du
Homme, Sam Fathers, Old Ben, Lion: these impenetrable male
icons brook no quarter, absorb no insult. Figures of imaginary
wholeness, they are archaic or marginal within the realm of the
ongoing social—a solution at one level that is a collapse at
another. Is there any doubt that Lucas reincarnates these figures
when he silences Roth by saying: “ I’m the man here (GDM
116)? In my reading. Intruder in the Dust continues this phantasmatic project, suturing Lucas into a monument of fixed
manhood, a phallus without the complications of interiority,
pure, immovable, impervious: imprisoned in the social yet
unbroken in the imaginary. It is as though, by 1948, the only
Man Faulkner could envisage among the puling boys and men
he gazed upon—the only figure beyond social cooptation and
therefore capable of genuine self-possession—^would have to
be black, immolated, and unconquerable. I turn to Paul D
in Beloved.
“Mister, he looked so . . . free. Better than me. Stronger,
tougher. Son a bitch couldn t even get out the shell by hisself but
he was still king and I was . . . Paul D stopped and squeezed his
left hand with his right. He held it that way long enough for it and
the world to quiet down and let him go on.
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Mister was allowed to be and stay what he was. But I wasn’t
allowed to be and stay what I was. Even if you cooked him you’d be
cooking a rooster named Mister. But wasn’t no way I’d ever be Paul
D again, living or dead. Schoolteacher changed me. I was some
thing else and that something was less than a chicken sitting in the
sun on a tub.” (B 72)

Like Faulkner’s totem animals that radiate an imaginary
integrity, Mister impresses Paul D as immovably centered, and
therefore free. Even eaten. Mister stays what he is, remains
intact, a feat beyond Paul D’s capacity. Paul D has lost his
proper, his own; owned and invaded by Schoolteacher, he has
been remade into a being he can no longer subjectify as himself
Why has his identity project failed and how does Morrison
propose its recovery?
We begin again with names. Garner named them all, bestow
ing both their names and their manhood. Others’ slaves were
treated as boys; Gamer’s were trained as men:
Beg to differ. Gamer. Ain’t no nigger men.”
“Not if you scared, they ain’t.” Garner’s smile was wide. “But if
you a man yourself, you’ll want your niggers to be men too.”
I wouldn’t have no nigger men around my wife. ”
It was the reaction Gamer loved and waited for. “Neither would
I, he said. Neither would I,” and there was always a pause before
the neighbor . . . got the meaning. Then a fierce argument,
sometimes a fight, and Garner came home bruised and pleased,
having demonstrated one more time what a real Kentuckian was:
one tough enough and smart enough to make and call his own
niggers men. (B 11)

Gamer performs exactly the definition of manhood he pretends
to offer his slaves: the maintenance of physical integrity, the
capacity to make good on your word, to prove it through bodily
prowess. White manhood is the maintaining of self-possession,
the adequation of one’s behavior to one’s will, the ability to
patrol one’s property—one’s self at all times, one’s wife in this
instance—and guarantee that she remains one’s own. The fights
break out over just this, the other men’s realization that Garner
has insulted their capacity to patrol their wives in the presence
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of nigger men, not boys. A “real Kentuckian” looks remarkably
like Old Carothers; he makes people do his bidding, assigns
their names and object-status in relation to his subject-control,
remains inalterably himself
Paul D’s crisis stems from his having been trained to believe
himself such a man.^® Choices had been made available to him,
he was never forced. Rather, he had subjectified the proffered
model, assented to the hailing, imagined himself in charge of
himself. Only later, after Morrison has exposed him to the full
brunt of slavery, does Paul D see that on this model he can
never be a man: the black experience of slavery simply disallows
the equation of male identity with male will. In Genovese s
words, “The slaveholders deprived black men of the role of
provider; refused to dignify their marriages or legitimize their
issue; compelled them to submit to physical abuse in the
presence of their women and children; made them choose
between remaining silent while their wives and daughters were
raped or seduced and risking death. The list continues. Paul
D’s experience of such impotence is harrowing.
The text produces him as a man invaded, treated like an
abusable woman. Things are put into male slaves: a bit in their
mouths, a penis in their mouths, irons upon their legs. If
manhood means self-ownership, Paul D is owned by others,
raped repeatedly. He ceases to be a single entity: his body
shakes uncontrollably (as Temple Drake’s does after her rape in
Sanctuary). He becomes a site of overrun boundaries: “Paul D
thought he was screaming; his mouth was open and there was
this loud throat-splitting sound—but it may have been some
body else. Then he thought he was crying. Something was
running down his cheeks. He lifted his hands to wipe away the
tears and saw dark brown slime” (B 110). Liquids pour out of
him, over him, into him; his own, those of others, those of
nature. Out of control, venting without knowing it just as
Sethe’s urine breaks without her consent, Paul D undergoes a
self-undoing that grotesquely reverses the Oedipal crisis. Rather
than struggle with taboo desires and succeed in imposing a
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boundary upon them—a boundary enabling eventual entry into
language, individuation, manhood, paternity, and property—
Paul D reverts, under such pressure, to a chaotic, prehuman
economy of liquids. At the extreme, when a male slave is
confronted with the utter incapacity of his will to affect his
reality, forced to watch impotently while his wife is beaten and
milked, he becomes—like Halle—simultaneously not-male and
insane (his identity no longer his own), a creature smeared in
butter, undone by a liquid economy erasing all boundaries,
disfiguring a face and a mind once male.
This critique of the Oedipal seems as profoundly Morrison’s
intention as the re-imagining of the Oedipal seems Faulkner’s.
As the grounding norm of white society, the Oedipal stabilizes
patriarchy itself^® It does so by providing Western culture’s
central paradigm for justifying the male child’s endurance of
(rather than rebellion against) libidinal repression imposed by
authority: justified because in time that child will achieve the
individuation of centered selfhood, will take on the structural
position of the vacated father, and will inherit his authority and
his possessions. To become properly oneself, to move from
infantile polymorphous perversity to adult conventionality, is to
discipline desire and to enter the genealogical field of propertydescent. Morrison shows that this gender economy—geared to
the patriarchal notions of propriety, property, and the proper—
must be reconceived if it is to nourish disenfranchised black
subjectivity. Beloved contributes in a number of ways to just
such a reconception.
There is, first, the tension between loving small and loving
large. Morrison’s commitment to the Margaret Garner materials
radiates from a slave woman’s refusal to love small. A sentimen
tal writer would have exonerated such large love, a lesser writer
would have criticized it: Morrison explores both its cost and its
necessity. She shows that for black slaves to love large is to
enact an identification that risks insanity when the loved ones
are abused: “He saw a witless coloredwoman jailed and hanged
for stealing ducks she believed were her own babies” {B 66). At
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the same time Morrison shows us that Paul D’s heart cannot be
confined within that rusted tin can. So long as he believes this,
Paul D is on the run, unwilling to invest his feelings where he
cannot, manlike, maintain his will. Indeed, his initial indictment
of Sethe—“You got two feet, Sethe, not four” {B 165)—follows
from a sense of manhood in which the proper still reigns: her
behavior is hers to patrol, there is a right and a wrong choice,
she has made the wrong one.
Our judicial system is founded in certain ways on such
distinctions; its notions of right and wrong are largely calibrated
according to the male criterion of self-responsibility before the
law. We are assumed individually responsible for patrolling our
territory, maintaining our proper/property. Beloved recurrently
undermines this model, perhaps most eloquently in those in
tense passages in part 2 where we cannot responsibly assign
utterance to speaker, say what belongs to whom. This collapse
of boundaries is writ with equal power in Sethe’s act itself—
“This here new Sethe didn’t know where the world stopped and
she began” (B 164)—an act in which self and world are inextrica
bly intertwined. The murder of the child explodes the bound
aries without which there can be no proper itself: it is her act
and yet not hers, her fault and yet not her fault. The weight of
an entire institution—the institution of slavery—must be
brought to bear, if we would understand how a mother might
kill a child out of love and be both right and wrong in doing so.
If the law is useless for sorting this out, if the law incites to
violence rather than to self-possession, if the law proposes no
credible paternal model for normative behavior, how is Oedipus
to oversee our maturation by laying down and legitimizing our
categories of gender difference? Paul D eventually comes to
see—in washing Sethe’s feet rather than counting them, in
nursing rather than judging—that male and female are massively
interdependent realms, and that a black man cannot sustain a
model of white manhood. As Hortense Spillers puts it, the
black American male embodies the only American community
of males which has had the specific occasion to learn who the
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female is within itself.
This female-within-male calls into
question gender categories in ways that go beyond the ken of all
impenetrable Misters.
*

*

*

I would close speculatively. Both writers know—how could they
not?—that the central damage done by slavery to black manhood
was to cripple individual agency. Unable to equate self with
will, black men were wounded in their own proper, their
capacity to own themselves, to become full-fledged Misters. “A
man without force,” Frederick Douglass had written as early as
1855, “is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human
nature is so constituted that it cannot honor a helpless man,
although it can pity him; and even that it cannot do long, if the
signs of power do not arise.^^gj^ impotence
to the pride that sustains identity fuels Faulkner’s intricate
exploration of Lucas Beauchamp and accounts for Intruder in
the Dust’s suturing of Lucas’s authority. Morrison, by contrast,
does not so much restore Paul D’s manhood as reconceive it.
The reconception calls into question the Oedipal economy of
the achieved proper itself
In her work—especially her theoretical work—^we find, fore
grounded, what we may be learning to recognize in Faulkner’s
as well (though against the grain), that identity of every sort is
differential rather than “properly” achieved. Self-owning is
rarely innocent. Men too often know who they are, they ratify
their self-image, through repudiating the other: they are not
women, they are not blacks. “I aint a nigger,” little Jason says
in That Evening Sun.
In this casual paradigm we see the
fantasy of a pure identity being constituted by a juxtaposition
against contaminating others. Morrison powerfully explicates
the drama, acted out in countless scenes in American history, in
which the meaning of white freedom requires for its salient
unfolding an immovable black silhouette. I quote from Playing
in the Dark:
The need to establish difference stemmed not only from the Old
World but from a difference in the New. What was distinctive in
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the New was, first of all, its claim to freedom and, second, the
presence of the unffee within the heart of the democratic experi
ment—the critical absence of democracy, its echo, shadow, and
silent force in the political and intellectual activity of some notAmericans. The distinguishing features of the not-Americans were
their slave status, their social status—and their color.
It is conceivable that the first would have self-destructed in a
variety of ways had it not been for the last. These slaves, unlike
many others in the world’s history, were visible to a fault. And they
had inherited, among other things, a long history on the meaning of
color. It was not simply that this slave population had a distinctive
color; it was that this color “meant” something. That meaning had
been named and deployed by scholars from at least the moment, in
the eighteenth century, when other and sometimes the same schol
ars started to investigate both the natural history and the inalienable
rights of man—that is to say, human freedom.^
Here we return to Locke and the Enlightenment with a
darker awareness that freedom and unfreedom, like male and
female, white and black, are inextricably interdependent
terms—that selfhood as achieved property plays itself out differ
entially, against a backdrop of dispossession. “Before slavery,”
Orlando Patterson argues, “people simply could not have con
ceived of the thing we call freedom.”^ Surely it is because
Faulkner’s characters so yearn for self-sufficiency that his texts
dramatize their discovery of internal rupture—their incapacity
to maintain identity as a self-patrolled property—as a tragic
burden. To be rudely ejected from the sanctuary of one’s
imaginary self-possession is to be involuntarily invaded by oth
ers, to be othered:
But after that I seemed to see them [black people] for the first time
not as people, but as a thing, a shadow in which I lived, we lived,
all white people, all other people. I thought of all the children
coming forever and ever into the world, white, with the black
shadow already falling upon them before they drew breath. And I
seemed to see the black shadow in the shape of a cross. And it
seemed like the white babies were struggling, even before they
drew breath, to escape from the shadow that was not only upon
them but beneath them too, flung out like their arms were flung
out, as if they were nailed to the cross. I saw all the little babies
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that would ever be in the world, the ones not yet even born—a long
line of them with their arms spread, on the black crosses.^
The speaker is Joanna in Light in August, but the burden she
carries here is more generally Faulknerian. It is the awareness
that those of us who are white are both orphaned and multiply
possessed, both abandoned and penetrated by our parents and
by the larger culture’s unwanted arrangements. Women not
only show men that they are, satisfyingly, men, but women also
live within men uninvited, disturbing the propriety of male
norms. And blacks, because of what those of us who are white
did to them in the South before we were even born, will forever
live inside us, owed a reparation beyond our capacity to repress
or repay. Insofar as the property model of identity may never
theless operate in Faulkner’s work—requiring the other’s disen
franchisement to know itself as free—it does so outside the
comforts of innocence, in the form of an overdetermined and
internalized debt, an accumulating cultural mortgage—a prop
erty with insurmountable liens upon it—one of those checks we
somehow co-signed before exiting from our mother’s womb and
which will be called in for cashing any day now.
Morrison, by contrast, seems to register the penetrability of
identity as both burden and promise. Whites may know them
selves as not-black, yes, but her best work goes past this
oppositional frame, opening into a complex embrace of the
mutuality that funds all identity.Identity as patrolled property
too easily slips into figurative ossification of self or literal en
slavement of others. Beloved shows, instead, the irresistible
need to live in others, to know self through identificatory
investment in others. You could be reduced to insanity by the
damage done to your loved ones, but you could also survive
disaster by identifying—as Sethe does in her flight to freedom—
with those beings who came from your body but who are not
you. They call to that in you that exceeds you, that is not your
property to patrol. Sethe’s breasts are not her own; they and
the milk they carry link her to her ofispring. The text’s most
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terrifying image is of white boys enclosing those breasts as their
own property. What is for Faulkner our human tragedy—that
we are never our own, are always trying to say, always inade
quate to and in excess of ourselves—is for Morrison our human
possibility.

NOTES
1. Others have said it too. Jim Carrothers said it to me at the American Literature
Association in San Diego (June 1994) when I brought up the Go Down, Moses analogy
for our ritual regrouping to discuss Faulkner. This and subsequent citations are from Go
Down, Moses (New York: Vintage International, 1990).
2. Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), in The
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and
trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), 18:105. I" the 7th chapter of
this text, Freud undertakes his fullest exploration of the dynamic of “identification,”
which he generalizes as “the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person”
(105). This tie may or may not be libidinal, and it can later occur significantly among
members of a group who share “an important emotional common quality . . [which] lies
in the nature of the tie with the leader” (108). This last description seems clearly to
implicate the odd bonding—affectional and rivalrous—^that unites scholars mutually
attached to a single author: like Faulknerians.
Laplanche and Pontalis characterize Freudian “Identification” as the “psychological
process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property, or attitude of the other
and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is by
means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified” {The
Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith [New York: Norton,
1973], 205). Such transformative dynamics may well be the core psychic resource
enabling subject-other interaction, in both life and literature. It is therefore fascinating
that Freud has, on the whole, so little to say about “identification,” and one may
speculate that Freud’s own anxiety about “identification”—e.g., his sustained silence
about Nietzche’s infiuence, his neurotic response to Jung’s brilliance, his insistence on
his own priority—is pertinent to his reticence. Freud’s insistence on the successful
negotiation of the Oedipal complex as achieved individuation may shed light on why he
only late in his career considered the radically “unindividuated” condition of the preOedipal. Jim Swan speculates that, for Freud, “Maturity (that is, masculine maturity)
means being well-defended against one’s past, which amounts to the same thing as
having a strong capacity for resisting identification. ... In effect, Freud’s picture of
maturity is of a man driven to outrun . . . identification with the body of his mother,
the original unity of mother and infant” (“Mater and Nanny: Freud’s Two Mothers and
the Discovery of the Oedipus Complex,” American Imago 31 [1974]; 9-10).
“Transference” may seem to be a rough synonym for “identification,” but Freudian
analysis differentiates sharply between them. Rather than relating transference to that
larger and continuing intersubjective process whereby one invests another with one’s
own psychic structures—or becomes oneself reshaped by the perceived structures of
the other—Freudians understand transference as primitive, neurotically charged, and
more narrowly enacted within the psychoanalytic encounter itself “For psycho-analy
sis,” Laplanche and Pontalis write, transference is blindly projective, “a process of
actualization of unconscious wishes. Transference uses specific objects and operates in
the framework of a specific relationship established with these objects. Its context par
excellence is the analytic situation. . . . Classically, the transference is acknowledged to
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be the terrain on which all the basic problems of a given analysis play themselves out”
(455)- Since the interactive model of identity that I am pursuing in this essay is
potentially reciprocal and enabling, I shall speak more of “identification” than of “trans
ference. ”
3. The OED gives twenty-three different definitions for “master” as a noun. Most of
them circulate around the notion of control over something (or someone) else, and the
seventh definition is typical: “One vdio has the power to control, use, or dispose of
something at will.” As early as the sixteenth century, British children in well-off families
were addressed by servants as “master” or “young master. ” (The OED's twenty-second
definition identifies “master” as “the usual prefix to the names of a young gentlemen
not considered old enough to be entitled to be called Mr.”) Remove the constitutive
relation between possessor and person/thing/concept being possessed, and the term
loses its conceptual core. (The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971], 2: 1738.)
4. It should be clear that I am describing in an ideal or normative fashion the
frame of assumptions that attach to “Mister. ” Actual usage varies enormously, yet the
normative frame (diminished since the Civil Rights activity of the 1950s and i9^s but
not eradicated) affects that usage.
5. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government, in John Locke, The Tux> Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 265-428. Subsequent citation from
Locke refers to this edition. For useful discussion of Locke’s importance to the Founding
Fathers’ notions of American politics and appropriate norms, see Bernard Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1967), Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Random
House, 1948), ’Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modem Republicanism: The Moral Vision
of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988), and James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
6. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American
Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), 60.
7. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Random House,
1948), 13.
8. Noah Webster, “A Citizen of America, ” The Debate on the Constitution, Part
One, ed. Bernard Bailyn (New York: The Library of America, 1993), 157-58.
9. Pangle (among others) notes this problem: “Locke’s conception of the natural law
of property . . . imposes no effective, intrinsic restriction on acquisitiveness” (161).
Indeed, this abuse remains unavoidable so long as inventive labor remains, in Locke’s
world view, a primary good. Subscribing to an Enlightenment project that has its source
paradoxically in both Bacon and Genesis, Locke sees the scientific progress of civilization
as founded on a limitless transformation of the brute, natural world. In Pangle’s words,
“The sum of Locke’s message, then, is this: so barren is nature, so difficult is it for
mankind to wrest from nature’s materials a comfortable existence, that there is no
ascertainable limit to the necessary growth in the productivity of human labor” (166).
10. Absalom, Absalom! (New York: Vintage International, 1990), 179. Subsequent
citation from Absalom refers to this edition.
11. I have developed this argument more fully in Faulkners Subject: A Cosmos No
One Owns (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 82-109. Foi" a rigorous
classification of the different registers of Faulknerian voice, see Stephen Ross, Fictions
Inexhaustible Voice: Speech and Writing in Faulkner (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1989).
12. Beloved (New York: New American Library, 1987), 141. Subsequent citation
from Beloved refers to this edition.
13. Locke writes: “But there is another sort of servants which by a peculiar name we
call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war are, by the right of Nature, subjected
to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I
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say, forfeited their lives and, with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and being in
the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as
any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property” (322-23).
Locke’s justificatory phrase—“taken in a just war”—may have made sense within an
Athenian frame, but its impertinence to the American scene was not lost on eighteenthcentury Americans. According to Bailyn, “The contrast between what political leaders
in the colonies sought for themselves and what they imposed on, or at least tolerated
in, others became too glaring to be ignored and could not be lightened by appeals to
the Lockean justification of slavery as the favorable fate of people who “by some act that
deserves death ” had forfeited their lives and had been spared by the generosity of their
captors. The reality of plantation life was too harsh for such fictions” (235).
14. Herbert Gutman’s The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 (New
York: Pantheon, 1976) establishes in detail the cultural reality of black marriage during
a period in which it did not legally exist. He warns against a confusion of the two realms
of “law and culture” (52).
15. For a fuller reading of Lucas’s overdetermined relationship to Old Carothers, see
Faulkners Subject, 64-81.
16. Deborah Sitter comments on Paul D’s model of manhood in related terms;
“Although Sixo is his [Paul D’s] model of a manly man, the qualities Paul D associates
with manliness originate in the dominant culture of the white slaveholder Mr. Garner.
’These qualities include strength, courage, and endurance—all of which Sixo possesses—
but they are directed toward maximizing the power of the individual to dominate
weaker beings” (‘"The Making of a Man; Dialogic Meaning in Beloved," AfricanAmerican Review 26 [1992]: 24).
17. Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York:
Random House, 1972), 490.
18. See Carolyn Porter’s reading of Absalom, Absaloml’s diagnostic engagement
with the patriarchy/Oedipal (“[Un]making the Father: Absalom, Absalom!," in The
Cambridge Companion to William Faulkner, ed. Philip M. Weinstein [New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995], 168-96). Porter argues that Absalom most disturb
ingly reveals what carnage occurs not when, as Bleikasten and others claim, the father
fails, but rather when, in classic patriarchal fashion, he succeeds. By the time of
Intruder in the Dust, I argue, Faulkner was seeking to dignify Lucas by immersing him
within an Oedipal structure as phantasmatically intact as it was materially nonexistent
(no actual father: no land, no goods, no descent—except at the level of the spirit).
19. Probably no novelist in America today is the subject of more academic commen
tary than Morrison. For a useful general introduction to Morrison studies, see Toni
Morrison: Critical Perspectives Past and Present, ed. Henry Louis Gates and K. A.
Appiah (New York: Amistad, 1993). For specific readings of Beloved that probe (through
both form and theme) the idea of the masculine “proper,” see Barbara Christian, “Fixing
Methodologies: Beloved," Cultural Critique, 24 (1993): 5-15, Karla Holloway, “Beloved:
A Spiritual,” Callaloo 13 (Summer 1990): 516-25, Deborah Horwitz, “Nameless Ghosts;
Possession and Dispossession in Beloved," Studies in American Fiction 17 (1989):
157-67, David Lawrence, “Fleshly Ghosts and Ghostly Flesh: The Word and the Body
in Beloved," Studies in American Fiction 19 (1991): 189-201, Satya Mohany, ‘"The
Epistemic Status of Cultural Identity: On Beloved and the Postcolonial Condition,”
Cultural Critique 24 (1993): 41-80, and Jean Wyatt, “Giving Body to the Word; The
Maternal Symbolic in Toni Morrison’s Beloved," PMLA 208 (May 1993): 474-88.
20. Maggie Sale, having studied contemporary reactions to Margaret Garner’s deed,
reinforces this claim: “The abolitionist press . . . represented Margaret Garner’s
infanticide as in the heroic tradition of the American fight for liberty .... [but] this
polemical interpretation erases the emotional cost of Gamer’s decision” (“Call and
Response as Critical Method: Afncan-American Oral Traditions and Beloved," in Afri
can-American Review 26 [1992]; 44). The proslavery press predictably read Gamer’s
behavior as simply monstrous.
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21. Hortense Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,”
diacritics 17 (1987): 80.
22. Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, in Frederick Douglass:
Autobiographies (New York: The Library of America, 1994), 286.
23. Collected Stories of William Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1950), 297.
24. Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (New York: Random
House, 1993), 48-49. A few pages earlier in the same essay, Morrison draws on Bernard
Bailyn’s Voyagers to the West to develop her most haunting vignette of American
freedom enacted upon the body of the black slaves. Silhouetted by figures of unfreedom
over whom he has (and exercises) absolute control, William Dunbar of Scotland
systematically beats his American slave and then thinks of himself as somehow magically
transformed within the new American landscape: “Once he has moved into that [new]
position, he is resurrected as a new man, a distinctive man—a different man. And
whatever his social status in London, in the New World he is a gentleman. More gentle,
more man. The site of his transformation is within rawness; he is backgrounded by
savagery” (PD 44).
25. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1982), 340.
26. Light in August (New York: Vintage International, 1990), 253.
27. It does not detract from Morrison’s remarkable imagination to note that the
mutuality she represents occurs less between whites and blacks than among blacks
themselves—and most memorably among black women. Yet Paul D shows a similar
resourcefulness in his capacity to enter the subjectivity of those other chain-bound
slaves in Alfred, Georgia. ’Their effective mutuality transforms that chain from bind to
bond, and they escape enslavement the only way they can: together.

